A suitable key agreement protocol plays an essential role in protecting the communications over open channels among users using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). This paper presents a robust and flexible password authenticated key agreement protocol with user anonymity for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) used by VoIP communications. Security analysis demonstrates that our protocol enjoys many unique properties, such as user anonymity, no password table, session key agreement, mutual authentication, password updating freely and conveniently revoking lost smartcards etc. Furthermore, our protocol can resist the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the stolen-verifier attack, the man-in-middle attack, the Denning-Sacco attack, and the offline dictionary attack with or without smartcards.
4 one-way authentication, but cannot support integrity and confidentiality protection. So the original authentication protocol was not good enough for providing acceptable security level in practice.
Several authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed in order to strengthen the security of SIP. In 2005, Yang [3] found that the original SIP authentication protocol incurred off-line password guessing attacks and server-spoofing attacks; they constructed a Diffie-Hellman key exchange-based SIP authentication scheme to solve the problems. But their protocol required the server storing a password table for verification purposes and involved expensive exponential computation which is not practical for SIP. Huang [4] later claimed that Yang's protocol suffered two weaknesses when applied to SIP. One was vulnerable to off-line password-guessing attacks and the other was requiring the execution of expensive exponential operations. So Yang's protocol was not suitable for low computational power devices. With these points in mind, Huang proposed a new authentication scheme for SIP.
Unfortunately, in [5] Jo discussed the cryptanalysis of Yang's and Huang's authentication protocols and demonstrated that both protocols were vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks. To avoid the requirement of large Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), identity-based cryptography was employed by Ring [6] to construct an authenticated key agreement for SIP.
Wang [7] found that Ring's protocol suffered escrow key problems, and presented a certificateless cryptography-based key agreement protocol, but the computational cost was very high.
In an attempt to improve efficiency, Wu [8] proposed an SIP authentication scheme based on Elliptic Curve Cryptograph (ECC) [19, 20] and proved its security formally by using Canetti-Krawczyk security model. Compared with previous schemes, Wu's protocol was more efficient, but Liao argued that the distribution of shared secret keys in Wu's protocol was a great obstacle to scaling up and the protocol failed to take system reparability into considerations [9] . To solve these problems, smartcards were employed to construct a password authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP by using a self-certified public key on elliptic curves. However, Liao's protocol was susceptible to stolen smartcard attacks. Ni [10] 5 indicated that there was scaling up problems associated with Wu's protocol, and proposed an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol under Canetti-Krawczyk Model by using elliptic curve cryptography. Furthermore, Yoon [11] demonstrated that Wu's SIP authentication protocol could not resist off-line password guessing attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks and Stolen-verifier attacks; Yoon proposed an authentication scheme to improve the security and to exploit the key block size, speed and security. Unfortunately, both Pu [12] and Gokhroo [13] claimed that Yoon's scheme was vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks and replay attacks. In 2009, Tsai [14] suggested a nonce-based SIP authentication scheme by using only one-way hash function and exclusive-or operations, thus reducing computational costs efficiently. However, in [15] Yoon argued that Tsai's scheme was vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks and stolen-verifier attacks. In addition, Tsai's scheme could not provide perfect forward secrecy, and they proposed a new scheme to overcome the weakness. In 2012, Xie [16] demonstrated that Yoon's scheme [15] could not resist stolen-verifier attacks and off-line password guessing attacks. They also proposed an improved protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography to solve above security problems. Moreover, Arshad [17] also indicated some security problems of Tsai's scheme. Besides the two attacks mentioned above, they claimed that Tsai's scheme did not provide known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy. In order to eliminate such security flaws, they proposed a mutual authentication protocol for SIP based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Most recently, He [18] presented a cryptanalysis of Arshad's protocol and found that Arshad's protocol could not resist off-line password-guessing attacks too. Based on Arshad's work, He suggested an improved mutual authentication protocol for SIP, which is immune to several possible attacks.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned protocols have several weaknesses. First, these protocols require SIP server to store a password or verification table consisting of the passwords or hashed passwords of all registered users for verifying the validity of users, making these protocols suffer from some attacks such as password guessing attacks, stolen-verifier attacks and server-spoofing attacks. In addition, since the password or verification tables are usually 6 very large, maintaining these tables makes these solutions hard to scale up, and the reset password problem decreases its applicability for practical use. Second, the aforementioned protocols failed to address the privacy issue of individuality as the real identities of users are transmitted in plaintext, adversaries could using intercepted messages to launch some attacks.
Third, the aforementioned protocols cannot provide password-updating functionality for users to change their password as requested.
To attack the problems mentioned above, we propose a robust and flexible password authenticated key agreement with user anonymity for SIP in this study.
Preliminaries
We first introduce the basic concepts of the elliptic curve cryptosystem and associated difficult problems, then review original SIP authentication.
Elliptic curve group and complexity problems
In an elliptic curve cryptosystem, the elliptic curve equation is defined as the form of 2 3 ( , We assume that the four problems above are intractable. That is, there is no polynomial time algorithm that can solve these problems with non-negligible probability.
SIP authentication procedure
SIP authentication security depends on the challenge-response mechanism. The original SIP authentication protocol requires the user and the server pre-sharing a password beforehand [1] . This pre-shared password is used to verify the identity of the user or the server in the authentication procedure. The original procedure performs the following steps as shown in 
Our Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme
This section presents our newly designed SIP authentication key agreement protocol with user anonymity. In our protocol, there are two entities, the user's smartcard and the server.
Our protocol consists of five phases: system setup, registration, pre-computation,
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System setup phase
In this phase, the user U and the SIP server S agree on some system parameters.
1:
StepS Server S first generates a large prime p and an elliptic curve equation ( , ) p E a b with order n , which is defined in Section 3.1.
:
StepS S finds a generator point P with order n over ( , ) 
, where G is a cyclic addition group that is generated by P over ( , ) p E a b .
StepS S keeps s secret and publishes information
Registration phase
When User U wants to register with SIP server S , it performs the following steps with S over a secure channel.
1:
S first verifies U through a secure identification protocol. If U is eligible, it freely chooses its user name username , password PW and a random integer
and submits it to S over a secure channel. . Then S stores the secure information ( , ) R T in the memory of U's smartcard and issues it to U through a secure channel.
3: StepR
Smartcard contains ( , , )
R T a
Upon receiving the smartcard, U writes the secret message c to the memory of the smartcard. Then U's smartcard contains ( , , ) R T c . Finally, U keeps PW and the smartcard secretly for authentication.
For each user, the registration phase performs once. 10 The smartcard generates a random integer W r P r is stored into the smartcard. Furthermore, the three-tuple is moved from the smartcard after authentication. This means the three-tuples are different in each session.
Pre-computation phase
Authentication phase
When user U wants to log into SIP server S , it must inserts its smartcard to a card reader and types its user name username and password PW . Moreover, the smartcard has to complete the pre-computation phase. Then the smartcard and the server cooperate to perform the following steps to authenticate each other as shown in Fig. 2 . REQUEST W V to S over a public channel. 
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:
StepA After receiving the response message, S verifies whether otherwise, it rejects the response message and terminates authentication. 
Auth h S r P r SK 
If the equation holds, 
h username c N and N to S , where N is a nonce for freshness checking.
:
StepP S decrypts the encryption message and verifies whether the authentication tag . It then sends
R T toU .
3:
StepP U decrypts the message and verifies whether the authentication tag
R T c in its smartcard.
Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of our authentication key agreement protocol for SIP.
Security properties
The security properties that should be considered for SIP authentication protocols are
Replay attacks, Man-in-the-middle attacks, Modification attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks, Stolen-verifier attacks, Offline dictionary attacks without smartcards, Offline dictionary attacks with smartcards, Session key security, Known-key security, Perfect forward secrecy, and Mutual authentication. 
Security analysis
Since the formal security proof of smartcard-based authentication key agreement protocols
is still an open problem, all published related protocols have been demonstrated with a simple proof. In this section, we follow the approaches used by Wu [21] and He [18] . First, we discuss the security of our protocol by analyzing some possible attacks, and then evaluate the security of our protocol. StepA . In this case, no RESPONSE message is sent back to Bob. Therefore, the replay attack cannot succeed in our protocol.
14 Proposition 2. Our protocol can resist man-in-the-middle attacks.
Proof. In order to prevent man-in-middle attacks, the user U and the server S should authenticate each other, which require Our protocol to provide mutual authentication between them. In our protocol, the user U and the server S share a session key SK only after mutual authentication between them. So, an adversary Bob cannot make the independent connections with the userU or the server S and relay messages between them, making them believe that they are communicating directly to each other over a private connection. Only if Bob passes the verification process of the server S , he can establish a session key SK with S , making the server S believe that it is talking to the user U . When Bob attempts to construct a valid authentication message to pass the verification process of the server S , he has to face the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. On the other hand, for the same reason Bob cannot impersonate the server S to share a session key with the userU . Thus, Bob cannot launch the man-in-middle attack to cheat either the user U or the server S . . Therefore, our protocol can resist the modification attacks.
Proposition 3. Our protocol can resist modification attacks.
Proof. Suppose an adversary Bob intends to impersonate the user
Proposition 4. Our protocol can resist Denning-Sacco attacks.
Proof. Suppose that an adversary Bob compromises an old session key SK and attempts to find the user's password or other session keys. In our protocol, the session key SK is constructed by 1 2 K r r P  , 1 r P , r and (
,where the random integers 1 2 , r r and r are different in each session process. When Bob tries to guess the user's password PW or other session keys from the compromised session key SK and other intercepted messages, he not only has to face the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, but also needs to break the hash functions, which cannot be solved with non-negligible probability.
Therefore, our protocol can protect SIP against Denning-Sacco attacks.
Proposition 5. Our protocol can resist stolen-verifier attacks.
Proof. An adversary who steals the password-verifier from the server uses it directly to masquerade as a legitimate user in a user authentication process, which is called the stolen- 16 verifier attack. Our protocol does not maintain any password or verification table on the server. Therefore, the protocol can resist the stolen-verifier attacks.
Proposition 6. Our protocol can resist offline dictionary attacks without smartcards.
Proof. Suppose an adversary Bob intends to carry out the offline dictionary attack, and through eavesdropping communications, Bob intercepts all messages relay between the user U and the server S . In order to obtain the user's password PW , Bob needs to extract is known to anybody but the user U and the server S . Therefore, our protocol provides session key security.
Proposition 9. Our protocol can provide known-key security.
Proof. In our protocol, the random numbers 1 r and 2 r generated independently by the server S and the user ' U s smartcard are different in each session process. So the session key . This is because in each session a fresh session key is generated depending on
r r P r P r , and the secret differs in every session.
Therefore, in our protocol, each run of the authentication and key agreement process produces a unique session key SK between the user U and the server S . r from ' 1 r P , which is equivalent to solving an instance of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Therefore, in our protocol, even if the user's password PW and the server's secret key s are compromised, the secrecy of previous session keys established by them cannot be affected.
Proposition 11. Our protocol can provide mutual authentication.
Proof. In our protocol, the server S and the user U authenticate each other by checking u Auth and s Auth , respectively. Therefore, our protocol can provide mutual authentication.
Proposition 12. Our protocol can provide security in choosing and updating passwords.
Proof. In our protocol, the legitimate user with smartcards can freely choose her or his favourite password in the registration phase. It makes users easy to remember their own passwords. Our protocol also provides an update password phase for users to change their password as requested. Even having been stolen or lost smartcards, any other person cannot change or update the password without knowing the current session key SK shared between the user U and the server S .
Proposition 13. Our protocol can provide user anonymity.
Proof. In our protocol, the anonymity of the userU is obtained by hash function, symmetric encryption technique and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. In the registration phase, the user name is protected by the password PW and a nonce c chosen by the user. The hashed user's identity consisting of the username username , the password PW and the nonce c is submitted to the server S . Even the server S does not know the real username of the userU .
In the authentication phase, the hashed username is protected by a secure symmetric encryption algorithm and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So, even if an adversary
Bob compromises the secret ( , , ) R T c stored in smartcards and record the used messages transmitted between the user U and the server S , he cannot derive the real username of the user without the knowledge of secret key s and user U's password PW .
Performance Comparison
In this section, we first summarize the functionality of our protocol and then compare our protocol with relevant protocols in terms of computational cost.
In our protocol, the user's password is embedded in ( 
s
T E h PW c h username c  
, the server stores the secrets in the memory of the user's smartcard, and then delivers the smartcard to the user via a secure channel. Obviously, during the registration process, the server does not need to store any password table. Furthermore, in our protocol, the user's real username is protected by hash function, symmetric encryption technique and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. The adversary cannot obtain the real username even if she or he 20 intercepts all the messages transmitted between the user and the server. Therefore, our protocol provides user anonymity to protect the user's privacy. Finally, our protocol provides a secure updating password phase for users to change their password freely and can resist stolen smartcard attacks. As shown in Table 2 , our protocol can provide more unique features such as no password or verifier table, user anonymity and password update freely, which has not been considered by other related protocols. In fact, these new features are very important in implementing a practical and universal authenticated key agreement for SIP-based VoIP communications. Table 2 . Functionality comparisons between our protocol and others Next, we discuss the implementation data. For the convenience of performance analysis, assume the AES cryptosystem is the symmetric encryption/decryption operation in our scheme. Duh [22] implemented AES based on MOTE-KIT 5040 (8- Table 3 . Table 3 . Execution times of related operations
In the registration phase, our protocol requires two hash operations to compute
on the user side, one scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve to obtain R and one symmetric key encryption operation to get T on the server side. In the pre-computation phase, the smartcard takes two scalar multiplication operations of elliptic curve to obtainW and 1 r P . In the authentication phase, the user takes two scalar multiplication operations of elliptic curve to compute 1 Since Arshad's protocol doesn't provide registration, there is no computational cost for the registration phase. Unlike our protocol, other protocols don't contain the Pre-computation and Password changing phases, thereby suffering from several attacks, so no computational costs are presented in Table 4 for these two phases.
In the pre-computation phase, since the integer r1 is chosen by smartcard instead of user, the message W=r1R and r1P are computed by smartcard at any time before the authentication phase. Although two scalar multiplication operations of elliptic curve are required in the precomputation phase, it would not affect the performance of the real-time VoIP communication since no data are transmitted during the pre-computation phase. Other protocols without smartcards cannot execute pre-computation, since users choose r1 differently during each authentication. So the performance is mainly dependent on the authentication phase. Fig. 3 Execution time comparisons between our protocol and others 24 As the authentication phase determines overall performance, execution time comparisons for authentication between our protocol and others are shown in Figure 3 . Clearly our protocol is as efficient as Arshad's, but is much efficient than the other three protocols (i.e. Yoon, Xie, He) in the authentication phase, this is because our protocol reduces the number of operations of scalar point multiplication of elliptic curve.
The total computational overhead of our protocol costs little more, that is because our protocol possesses many unique features, such as not maintaining any password or verification table on the SIP server, users being able to choose or change its own password freely and providing user anonymity to keep user's identity secret while still allowing the server to perform its own authentication, which requires more operations. Moreover, for each user the registration phase performs only once and the password change phase only performs when users need to update their passwords. Therefore, this minor computational increase is indispensable for constructing a reliable and trustworthy authenticated key agreement for SIP used by VoIP-based real-time communications systems.
Conclusion
A new password authenticated key agreement protocol with user anonymity for SIP has been proposed in this paper. In our protocol, the user and the server can achieve mutual authentication and key agreement by using passwords and smartcards. Meanwhile, our protocol can withstand replay attacks, impersonation attacks, stolen-verifier attacks, man-inmiddle attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks and offline dictionary attacks with or without smartcard. In addition, our protocol also provides some unique features such as user anonymity, no password table needed, revoking lost smartcard conveniently and password updating freely. These new features have not been considered in other related work, but they 25 are very important to implementing a practical and universal authenticated key agreement for SIP.
